“How can I deny that these hands and this body are mine?” wonders Judith Butler, following Descartes, in her essay bearing the same title (1997). The question of thinking corporeality and affect has been present from the beginning of philosophy, but remains problematic in a constructivist context, where nothing exists outside of language. In his *Ethics* (1671), Spinoza claims that “no one has yet determined what the body can do” (P2, III). Martin Heidegger resolves to take Spinoza’s claim further and affirms that “we don’t ‘have’ a body; rather, we ‘are’ bodily” (99). Thus, Heidegger marks the point of departure into the contemporary study of emotions and the body: the body not only as an object, but as a subject which can be affected in its perception of reality.

The turn to affect theory and the study of emotions and corporeality has been debated for a long time in critical theory. It has got its critics (Leys 2011) and defenders (Berlant 2009), but it could be stated that it provides new and enriching ways of reading literature at a time when “critical theory is facing the analytic challenges of ongoing war, trauma, torture, massacre and counter/terrorism” (Clough 2007: 2). The turn to affect reflects thus a shift in theorising power relations and social organisation that can be also traced in culture. Given literature’s appeal to the emotions —present ever since Aristotle’s *Poetics*—, examining affect in texts in dialogue with cultural studies can unravel how emotional epistemologies are formed, maintained and even changed.

*Corporalidad, Temporalidad, Afectividad: Perspectivas filosófico-antropológicas* is the first monograph published by Spanish critical theorists entirely dedicated to the study of affect theory, which had not, until now, received proper critical attention in Spain. While Ruth Leys wonders in her article “The Turn to Affect: A Critique” why so many scholars are “fascinated by the idea of affect” (2011: 435), I would
reverse her question and ask why the discussion of affect theory has taken so long to arrive in Spain. Leys’s suggestion is that these theorists want to account for how politics and rationality operate, and how emotion and corporeality have been overlooked when trying to explain the former (435). Regardless of how we try to justify our actions by means of rationality, emotions play a key role in politics and ideology, and this is perhaps more evident now than ever. Although Leys has reservations for a theory that accounts emotions as innate and empty of meaning, analysing the history of emotions and how these are culturally constructed and manipulated will lead to a better understanding of power, justice and oppression in the world.

As the editors Luisa Paz Rodríguez Suárez and José Ángel García Landa indicate in the introduction, the present volume intends to spark theoretical discussion on affect, temporality and corporeality by bringing together scholarly debate from different disciplines and angles, from the cognitive sciences to the history of emotions to philosophy, applied to a range of fields in the humanities and the social sciences. The chapters are ordered following a deductive logic: from the general—the first theories and discoveries of affect, be it in philosophy or the cognitive sciences—to the specific—analysis of anthropological behaviour, literature and society, demonstrating how these findings can be applied.

The first chapter, by Javier San Martín, tackles the lack of study of emotion and affect in Spain. San Martín posits the Spanish philosopher José Ortega y Gasset and his theory of the three lives—biological, biographical and psychological—as a point of departure to deal with the impact of memory and the body in the study of phenomenology. San Martín claims that the subject is mediated and so is memory (51). At the same time, he points out how phenomenology impacts the cognitive sciences and neuroscience and affirms that “the remembered is the body in a perceptive act” (52, my translation), and therefore “neuroscience cannot do away with human life” (53, my translation). In the second chapter, “Affect and intentionality of the body,” Francisco Rodríguez Valls nuances Darwin’s idea of the emotions as universal. Accepting the claim that emotions are adaptive and serve the purpose of intra- and interspecific communication, Rodríguez Valls, following phenomenologist...
Marleau-Ponty, proposes the term “intentionality of the body” as an alternative way to interpret emotion (72). Thus, emotion can be read as knowledge before knowledge in a given situation, as an a priori structure that will cast itself into its culture-specific form. In “Corporeality and existence in Heidegger,” Luisa Paz Rodríguez Suárez delves into Heidegger’s theory of the body and his much studied “phenomenon of the body” [Leibphänomen]. Despite Sartre’s claims that Heidegger had overlooked the body in his Being and Time (1927), many scholars have pointed out the importance of Heidegger’s anti-dualism and his claim that “[w]e are not first of all ‘alive,’ and only then getting an apparatus to sustain our living which we call ‘the body’, but we live insofar as we live bodily” (100). The importance of Heidegger’s claim lies in his positing the body as a living entity, as a subject, and therefore, a socio-political entity, a being-with-others, as Rodríguez Suárez argues. The following chapter builds also on Heidegger’s philosophy of the body, but this time Felipe Johnson addresses Heidegger’s readings on Aristotle. According to Johnson, Heidegger’s understanding of existence as bodily allows for new ontological perspectives on identity, ontological belonging and the possibilities of being-in-the-world.

After this theoretical display, readers are equipped to explore specific topics, such as dressing, which is explored as a nomadic body by Lazar Koprinarov. Following Deleuze and Guattari’s A Thousand Plateaus, Koprinarov analyses the dressed body as an always-becoming nomadic identity of the ever-changing, ever-adapting contemporary subject. In the following chapter, José Ángel García Landa examines temporality from George Herbert Mead’s perspective, which states that time and temporality are assigned with symbolic meanings—for instance, the subjective reconstruction of the past, the thinking of the present as already past, or the construction of future as hope or fear—, allowing for temporality to unfold as a complex system of symbols whose meaning can be altered or redressed. Aránzazu Hernández Piñero adds to García Landa’s study of temporality by looking at it from the theoretical frame of Rosi Braidotti’s nomadic subjectivities. Braidotti draws from Deleuze and Irigaray to explore the construction of difference as Other in the world, in order to look for a theoretical standpoint which affirms difference. Braidotti’s proposal is that of nomadic subjects, in a “politics of location” —following Adrienne
Rich’s term (1986)—that is not fixed and can be transformed in order to overcome different layers or temporalities of oppression such as gender, race or class. However, Hernández Piñero criticizes the lack of a sharp definition in Braidotti’s temporalities of becoming in order not to be just another form of “intersectionality” (term coined by Kimberlé Crenshaw in 1989).

In her chapter on narrative empathy, Beatriz Penas Ibáñez applies Suzanne Keen’s theory of narrative empathy to Salman Rushdie’s *Joseph Anton: A Memoir* in order to carry out what she terms “the hermeneutics of memory.” Penas Ibáñez analyses how empathy is narratologically constructed in *Joseph Anton* by following the different strategies developed in Keen’s theory, namely bounded strategic empathy, ambassadorial strategic empathy, and broadcast strategic empathy. This way, an intersubjectivity is created between author/character and reader in order to share Rushdie’s experience of living in hiding after the *fatwa* that condemned him to death. Rushdie’s strategy makes it possible to see the Other as an I. In turn, Elvira Burgos Díaz writes on the desire to protect ourselves from the Other by discussing Judith Butler’s and Wendy Brown’s theories on the sealing nation-state and its desire for sovereignty and non-vulnerability. From a feminist perspective, Brown posits the sealed state as “masculine” and hierarchically superior to a feminised nation, in a heterosexual coupling where the former protects the latter and the latter cares for the former. Burgos Díaz links Brown’s argument with Judith Butler’s claim that after 9-11 the state has strived for returning to its sealed, impenetrable and invulnerable masculine conception. Butler proposes a post-sovereign subject that can affect and be affected, vulnerable and open, in the defence of non-violence. Since the subject is culturally and socially constructed, according to Butler, acknowledging an open, changing, interdependent conception of society allows for the subject to have agency and therefore the possibility of action in order to create new contexts of life and contest oppressive ones, such as gender and compulsory heterosexuality, which Burgos Díaz discusses, affirming vulnerability as resistance and change.

Love as openness is another important topic in this volume. In his chapter “Love and human perfection. Interpersonal knowledge,”
Pedro Luis Blasco brings forth love as a means of transcendence and as a way of perfection of the self. Following different authors such as Ortega y Gasset, Gurméndez, Comte-Sponville and Dilthey, Blasco defines a gnosology of love, where love is a place for intuitive knowledge and encounter with the world and with oneself. In “Affect and difference,” Gemma del Olmo Campillo tries to reconcile these two apparently opposing terms. Drawing on poet and activist Audre Lorde, del Olmo Campillo argues that difference is seen as a problem from which tensions and discomfort arise in society. Union and homogeneity are valorised, and difference is considered as a threat and a criticism that which can destabilise the status quo. However, the demand for change and the end of oppression and hierarchies should be actually considered an improvement of society. The norm is another difference that which is considered as norm only because a power structure is set. Acknowledging difference, accepting it and letting ourselves be affected by it, according to Lorde, is the only way to reach an understanding and end with violence, the only way to legitimise the value of all lives. In the last chapter, Juan Velázquez tries to delineate a phenomenology of love and self-understanding. Following love as understanding as proposed by philosophers such as St. Augustine, Heidegger or Hannah Arendt, Velázquez signals the possibilities of love as a vehicle towards the understanding of the possibilities of the self. Drawing on Scheler, Velázquez argues that love would not be a “feeling,” but a “movement” towards the loved one (289), a movement that allows for the understanding of the love-object in the deepest meaning of the word: psychological understanding. This understanding is what allows valuing the love-object not only for what it already is, but for what it can be, in its ontological totality, following Augustine, and its application to what the author terms “legitimate self-love” would provide us with a deeper understanding of ourselves and our possibilities in the world.

All in all, the essays in this collection are varied and rich, tackling on different issues of affect theory and displaying diverse theories and examples of their multidisciplinary applications. I would recommend this collection to any scholar looking for an introduction of affect theory and its different strands explored in Spain. Since the field of affect theory and the history of the emotions is currently growing into very interesting directions, not because it is a “trend,” as Lauren...
Berlant complains she was once told (131), but rather because current politics are heavily intertwined with affect and emotion. Thus, I hope that this volume is the first one of the many to be published in Spain on affect theory and I hope for further discussions on contemporary affect theorists such as Sara Ahmed, Lauren Berlant or Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick.

As a suggestion for further volumes, I would appreciate a more political approach, stemming from a clearly defined standpoint and a critique grounded in social reality. According to some critics, emotions are not innocent, autonomous or untainted. Rather, emotions are culturally filtered, adapted and policed. As Sara Ahmed has argued, “emotions can attach us to the very conditions of our subordination” (12), providing as an example the subordination of women to unwaged reproductive, care and emotional labour “out of love.” Emotions can indeed keep subjects under exploitative conditions in order to remain in proximity to what they (should) desire. They may also promote unfair, discriminatory behaviours and manipulate the masses in order to seal themselves against difference and vulnerability. Not every-body can be “open” in the same way to be affected by the world—bodies are marked by gender, race, class, ability, sexuality, among others. There are layers of vulnerability that designate whose lives can be affected and in which way. A further volume shedding light on what Donovan Schaefer terms a “phenomenology of politics” (n.p.), instead of an ontological approach to affect, would help to understand how emotions, corporeality and temporality are utilised in the current political climate to create certain subjectivities and sensibilities could help us attain a fairer world and undo painful structures of power. What do we know yet about what the body can do, after all?

WORKS CITED


